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The first exposure most new students of American history have to 
problems of scholarly interpretation invariably centres on the modem 
chestnut "conflict or consensus." Is American history the product of a 
long series of battles between diametrically opposed forces reflecting a 
society with deep internal divisions or of a slow evolutionary liberal 
process of change reflecting a society in essential agreement? A general 
weariness with the debate seems to be setting in but the historical profes-
sion has so far been unable to formulate a new paradigm to replace 
the old one. 
One problem bedevils both the consensus and the conflict historians 
of the American Revolution. Proponents of the consensual model, no 
matter how much they emphasize the shared experience of the revolu-
tionaries, cannot dispel from most minds the conviction that at the very 
least geographic disputes between East and West, agricultural countryside 
and commercial urban areas, seacoast and backcountry, or river valley 
and uplands, split the revolutionaries. Given the wide acceptance by 
historians of one of these splits in most colonies, it is hard to imagine 
that there would not be political divisions. Yet, while the conflict historians 
score this basic telling point, they cannot explain what held the rev-
olutionaries together enough to enable theni to be so successful. Given 
internal conflict, why did the revolutionary movement not disintegrate 
into warring factions? Why was one insurrection, Shay's Rebellion, the 
only serious internal challenge to the orderly process of fighting a war 
and forming a nation? When this cohesion is juxtaposed with the evidence 
of serious divisions, we seem to be left with the conclusion that the 
revolutionary movement had some conflict and some consensus ; enough 
of one to make the road from colony to nation bumpy but enough of 
the other to ensure a safe arrival at the destination. 1 
One of the means of resolving the conflict-consensus debate about 
the Revolution lies in understanding the leadership roles of a few weaithy, 
patrician Whigs. In the New England colonies, for example, deep divisions 
• Department of History, University of Winnipeg. 
1 This moderate view is essentially accurate. Although not dramatic, it is historical 
and accomodates the evidence presented by both conflict and consensus historians. See 
Edmund MoRGAN, The Birth of the Republic (Chicago, 19S6), pp . . 4-13, 99-101, and passim. 
Morgan argues that the colonists' English background, Protestant religion, widespread 
ownership of property, long tradition of self-government, and love of the English constitution 
were sufficient to overcome regional, social, economic, and ideological differences. 
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existed that were serious enough to weaken the cohesiveness of society; 
but at critical moments in each colony's history, when events threatened 
to rip it apart, a wealthy patrician associated in the strongest possible 
sense with the colony's governing 'elite managed to emerge as a concil-
iatory unity figure who could avert the tragedy of a true civil war. 
Recent quantitative studies of leadership shed valuable and needed light 
on subtle shifts and trends that may have occurred or started in the 
Revolution. But one could measure ten percent drops in the social origins 
of leaders ad infinitum and still miss the crucial importance of these men 
whose vital statistics would not significantly affect a quantitative model. 2 
For their decisive roles only a qualitative analysis will suffice. 
An understanding of a basic tension in colonial New England society 
is crucial to this qualitative analysis. From their. seventeenth-century 
roots as Englishmen and covenanted Puritans living in homogeneous 
nucleated agricultural villages, all the experience of New Englanders 
had taught them to prize unity and fear conflict. It is clear, however, that 
since at least 1700 the social structure of New England, growing more 
pluralistic with every decade, militated against social harmony. Immigra-
tion and emigration, the differentiation of communities ranging on a scale 
from old settled urban · areas to new frontier towns, growing disparities 
in social and economic classes, acute religious ferment, and the rise of 
economic individualism, all combined to shatter the organic unity within 
each colony. ·Yet, while the reality disappeared or perhaps never existed 
the goal lingered on and a gap emerged between New England's ideas 
and practice. Contending "factions," as contemporaries said, ~ character­
ized New England from at least the Great Awakening onwards and created 
a society in the words of one historian, of "antipartisan theory and par-
tisan reality.'' 3 
As the Great Awakening religious struggles blended into the pre-
revolutionary struggles of the 1760s, it seemed to many New Englanders 
that society could not survive the conflicts. The revolutionary generation, 
fighting for freedom from one tyranny, was sufficiently wise, however, 
to realize that repressing conflict would not eliminate it. Rather than 
suppress what would only rear up again, they sought leadership that 
would have sufficient wealth, ancestry, and dignity to inspire awe and 
respect, unchallengeable credentials as Whig friends of liberty but mod-
erate, compromising natures, and the delicate ability to cater to the middle 
2 I do not mean to suggest that the recent work of James Kirby Martin which 
analyzes quantitative changes in leadership during the Revolution is not valuable - it is. 
Martin's work, however, analyzes only one aspect of leadership and I believe that my 
present essay significantly adds to the picture he has drawn of leadership and the Revolution. 
Martin and I both aaree that elite leadership played a major role ill the revolution. I believe, 
however, that his evidence of a change from an imperial to a local elite should not neces-
sarily be interpreted as a democratizing shift in power. See James Kirby MARTIN, Men 
in Rebellion. Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1973). 
3 This point is perceptively developed by both Stephen PATTERSON, Political 
Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts (Madison, Wisconsin, 1973), chap. I; and Richard 
D. BROWN, Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts : The Boston Committee of Cor-
respondence and the Towns, 1772-1774 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), pp. 9-10. 
PATRICIAN LEADERSHIP AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 377 
classes while all the while maintaining a social distance clearly above 
them. In short, a wealthy patrician, revolutionary but moderate, aloof 
but sensitive to the people, was the ideal leader to balance all the tensions 
in society - a father figure, a tender patriarch, who like all fathers was 
not arbitrary and severe but knew more than his children and had deep 
concern for them. 4 Such men emerged in the crucial moments of the 
Revolution in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode 
Island: John Hancock, William Pitkin, Meshech Weare, and Joseph 
Wanton. 
JOHN HANCOCK AND THE FIRST GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
The most sophisticated consensus historian of the Revolution in 
Massachusetts, Richard D. Brown, in his work on the relationship between 
the Boston Committee of Correspondence and the towns, while em-
phasizing essentially the shared convictions of eighteenth-century Massa-
chusetts men, does admit that pre-revolutionary era divisions did surface 
in a "court" and "country" party that emerged in 1739 in a dispute over 
economic policies. 5 The labels "court" and "country" were replaced by 
"Tory" and "Whig" a generation later. The most recent conflict historian 
of Massachusetts in this era, Stephen Patterson, in his book on revolu-
tionary politics; argues that the conflict in late colonial Massachusetts 
imposed itself upon the Revolution and did not end with the separtion of 
the loyalists from the patriots. Patterson believes that deep sectional, ideo-
logical, and class conflicts over the direction of the new state resulted 
in five bitter years of struggle among the revolutionaries that saw the 
partisan rejection of one proposed constitution· in 1778 and the near 
rejection of another in 1780. Middle-class agrarian westerners in Pat-
terson's view fought for democratic reforms against an eastern merchant-
dominated elite who resisted all attempts to alter the nature of society 
and government. 6 Though many historians would be unwilling to accept 
the ideological and class characteristics Patterson attributes to the conflict, 
few would deny that at least a naked power struggle raged between the 
East and the West. Robert Taylor's definitive study of western Mas-
sachusetts during the Revolution shows that westerners "had a mind of 
their own" that grew increasingly distrustful of the eastern seaboard after 
the decision for independence was made. 7 The other serious scholar of 
western Massachusetts, Lee Newcomer, while trying to maintain a consen-
sus overview, is forced to admit that a populist wing centring in the 
Berkshire Mountains adjacent to the province of New York dissented 
vociferously from the eastern revolutionary leadership. Newcomer tries 
to submerge the conflict as "strife within an oversized family" but the 
ruler. 
• BROWN, Revolutionary Politics, p. 10, discusses the wise patriarch as the ideal 
5 BROWN, Revolutionary Politics, p. 7. 
6 PATIERSON, Political Parties, passim. 
7 Robert TAYLOR, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution (Providence, Rhode 
Island, 19S4), p. 3. 
• 
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evidence he amasses speaks louder than his consensual conclusions and 
shows that the West bitterly blamed the "locusts and cankerworms" in 
the East for a variety of ills. 8 Richard D. Brown agrees that the divisions 
over the constitutions pitted East against West as both regions vied for 
control of the new government. 9 
Division was so deep that probably a majority of Massachusetts' 
freemen opposed the constitution of 1780 and only gimmickry in the 
method of ratification resulted in its adoption. 10 With such entrenched 
antagonism one would expect that the first election fought for control of 
the new government under the new constitution would be a political 
bloodletting. Surprisingly, almost miraculously considering the back-
ground, John Hancock secured election as governor, the most powerful 
executive position in the new nation in 1780, by the resounding triumph 
of 9,475 votes to the 888 for his nearest rival, James Bowdoin. No 
historian has adequately explained the popularity Hancock enjoyed in both 
the East and West that resulted in this deluge of approval. With such 
conflict over power how can one account for such consensus over leader-
ship? 
A confluence of circumstances made John Hancock such a popular 
and unifying figure that the governor's chair could not possibly have 
been filled by any other. Foremost among these circumstances was his 
prestigious ancestry. His grandfather, John Hancock, a minister, achieved 
such fame for his piety and godliness in a society which was still fun-
damentally Puritan and prized these as its highest attributes that he was 
known as "Bishop Hancock." His father, also named John, and also a 
minister, fell short of similar fame only by a premature death. John, the 
patriot, was raised by his uncle, Thomas Hancock, America's wealthiest 
merchant. No other Massachusetts man had as formidable a combination 
of piety and wealth in his ancestry. 11 "King Hancock," as he was dubbed, 
had wealth and economic power sufficient to cause the normally sceptical 
John Adams to accept at face value the exaggerated statement that "not 
less than one thousand families were, every day in the year, dependent 
on Mr. Hancock for their daily ~read." 12 The naming of Hancock in 
Hampshire County Massachusetts in 1776 testifies to the family's esteem. 
Not only Hancock's economic power and ancestral piety inspired awe 
in the electorate ; his highly visible aristocratic living style commanded 
the attention of all. This was not a generation that looked for republican 
simplicity in its leaders. Hancock was a grandee and never tried to hide 
8 Lee NEWCOMER, The Embattled Farmers: A Massachusetts Countryside in 
the American Revolution (New York, 1953), pp. 87, 88, 99. 
9 BROWN, Revolutionary Politics, p. 241. 
10 Samuel Eliot MoRISON, "The Struggle Over the Adoption of the Constitution 
of Massachusetts , 1780," Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, L (1916-1917): 
353-412. 
11 See Herbert ALLAN, John Hancock : Patriot in Purple (New York, 1953), 
pp . 1-3; W.T. BAXTER, The House of Hancock: Business in Boston , 1724-1775 (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 1945), pp. 4, 6, 224; and Lorenzo SEARS, John Hancock, The Picturesque 
Patriot (Boston, 1912), pp. 12-15. 
12 Adams is quoted in Arthur ScHLESINGER, The Colonial Merchants and the 
American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York, 1918), p. 254. 
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it. He travelled in an elegant coach drawn by six horses and attended 
by four servants - his coach and entourage were used to convey the 
first French ambassador when he presented his credentials to the Continen-
tal Congress - seerned to be addicted to beautiful and elegant clothes, 
always insisted upon his social due as New England's foremost aristocrat 
and a senior revolutionary statesman, and made a "hobby [of] the dinner 
table." 13 Hancock's whole person was the antithesis ofthe simple yeoman 
revolutionary. Radical egalitarians like Samuel Adams may have con-
demned these trappings as contrary to what they perceived the rev-
olutionary spirit to be but the masses did not. To them Hancock was 
risking one of the greatest fortunes and reputations in the colonies in 
order to make people free from oppressive power. Not only did every 
aspect of Hancock's bearing impress them but the fact that he ·had so 
much to lose - that he risked so much - made his commitment all the 
more meaningful. The Reverend Thatcher, Hancock's pastor, expressed 
this when he preached that Hancock's combining of "a fortune superior 
to any" with such ardent patriotism "rendered him the idol of his fellow 
citizens." 14 Instead of his regal bearing costing him popularity, it occa-
sioned it by making clear to all just how important a man had committed 
himself to the movement. 
Hancock had other assets that commended him to the people as the 
proper leader of the Revolution in Massachusetts. Thougl) his commit-
ment to liberty was clear and known to all, after all one of the most 
celebrated pre-revolutionary events involved a British Custom's attack 
on a Hancock ship, the Liberty, Hancock's cautious personality always 
caused him to adopt moderate compromise views around which discordant 
Revolutionaries could group. Virtually every scholar who has examined 
Hancock's revolutionary career concludes that he was a "trimmer" 
who never took a hard position on either side of any debate. He trimmed 
between the apprehensive merchants worried over losing their fortunes 
and the inflamed populace which demanded total adherence to the non-
importation agreements. Intellectually inferior to most of the members of 
the Continental Congress, Hancock's saving grace as President was his 
ability to mediate between bitterly antagonistic factions and maintain 
unity. The adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and of the 
Federal Constitution of 1787 in Massachusetts owes much to his ability to 
compromise opposing views. Many elite contemporaries condemned 
Hancock's invariable fence-straddling and most historians have considered 
it his most serious weakness. His "vacillating" and "chameleon" char-
acter usually is ascribed to his love of popularity and his ambition to be 
governor. 15 A composite negative picture has emerged of a man too weak 
to take any stand that might cost him the approval of the masses. 
13 ALLAN, Hancock, p. 4; BAXTER, House of Hancock, pp. 148, 169; and SEARS, 
Hancock, pp. 176, 177. 
14 ALLAN, Hancock, p. 4; BAXTER, House of Hancock, p. 308; and SEARS, 
Hancock, p. 325. 
15 See ALLAN, Hancock, pp. X, 134, 180, 191, 206, 324; BAXTER, House of 
Hancock, pp. 149, 224, 240; PATTERSON, Political Parties, pp. 71, 72, 87, 132, 185, 186; 
SCHLESINGER, Merchants, p. 255; SEARS, Hancock, pp. ix, x; and TAYLOR, Western 
Massachusetts, p. 174. 
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The people of Massachusetts, however, did not perceive Hancock's 
constant compromising to be a character ftaw but instead saw it as the 
virtue of a man who tried to heal society's wounds. If Hancock's goal 
was to retain popularity and be the leader of his native province, he was 
phenomenally successful. The people of Massachusetts, respectful of his 
wealth, ancestry, and piety, impressed by his devotion to liberty and the 
risks he ran for it, and grateful for the moderating role he played between 
the forces threatening to tear their society apart, saw him as the one man 
they could rally around and trust with the care of their new government. 
Hancock's overwhelming election as governor in 1780 transcended all 
internal differences and prevented Massachusetts from degenerating into 
two warring camps. A leader like Samuel Adams who lacked noted 
ancestry and personal wealth but who was known for his devotion to 
republican simplicity and purity of principle never could command the 
popular support in Massachusetts of Hancock. Historians may be im-
pressed by Adams' credentials as a revolutionary but to Massachusetts 
men he was too "middlin'" to inspire great respect and too controversial 
and partisan to be trusted with the new government. Adams would increase 
the society's divisions and aggravate its wounds while Hancock could 
close and heal them. 
WILLIAM PITKIN AND THE STAMP ACT ELECTION IN CONNECTICUT 
Connecticut, famed as the "land of steady habits," experienced a 
steady erosion of this virtue throughout the eighteenth century. 16 The 
fundamental agreement of Connecticut society on most matters of im-
portance that had characterized the seventeenth century ended when 
economic ambition fueled by land fever engendered controversy both at 
the colonial and local level. The Great Awakening which affected 
Connecticut more than any other colony resulted in the formation of two 
clearly defined factions fighting for control of the colony. The New Lights, 
proponents of the revival, drew their strength primarily from the eastern 
part of the colony which was its most recently settled area, and seemed 
to stand for a new order in Connecticut society emphasizing individualism 
and anti-authority impulses. The Old Lights, drawn primarily from the 
older towns of the colony in the West, viewed the new religion as "enthusi-
astic," which was akin in today's language to vulgar, feared its leveling 
tendencies, and tended in their more exaggerated statements to stigmatize 
it as anarchic. Amidst the viciously partisan struggles in the 1740s and 
1750s which intruded into all aspects of public affairs and which horrified 
everyone, the Old Lights managed to maintain a tenuous hold on the 
governorship, an elected position in Connecticut, and on the Assistants' 
16 For a discussion of " steady habits" and other traits of colonial Connecticut 
see Bruce C. DANIELS, . "Connecticut's Place in the American Colonies : What's In a 
Nickname?" Bulletin of The Connecticut Historical Society (in press). 
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Coucnil. which was the upper house of the legislature and collectively 
advised. the governor on all matters of state. 17 
As in Massachusetts, the struggles of the era of the Great Awakening 
fastened themselves on the pre-revolutionary debates in Connecticut. 18 
The most climatic and crucial moment in Connecticut:s revolutionary 
years came early in 1766, when the New Lights ousted the Old Lights 
from the governorship and the Assistants' Council in a political battle 
fought over the Stamp Act. The Old Lights had, like all Connecticut 
men. opposed the passage of the Stamp Act but as men with a commit-
ment to law and order they agreed to uphold the Act once it became law. 
The New Lights, more devoted to purity of principle and less devoted 
to accepting authority, asserted that the Act should never be obeyed. 
Connecticut's Sons of Liberty opposed the Act by peaceful petition, 
a newspaper and pamphlet campaign, and even by physical attacks on 
men implementing the law. It seemed to most sober Connecticut men 
that violence might engulf the entire colony and prevent the East and 
West from ever again acting in harmony or agreeing upon the essentials of 
government. When Governor Thomas Fitch, an Old Light, and three 
assistants took the oath in November 1765 to uphold the Act, the New 
Lights intensified their attempts to drive these "enemies of liberty" from 
the government. In the elections of spring 1766, William Pitkin replaced 
Fitch as governor by "votes too numerous to count" and all three 
assistants were defeated. The New Light triumph was complete and 
historians acknowledge the driving of the Old Lights from power and 
William Pitkin's election as Connecticut's Revolution. The triumph of 
Pitkin and the New Lights, however, did not exacerbate the existing 
tensions, but presaged the end of the severe warfare between the East and 
West that had threatened to destroy Connecticut's homogeneity. Though 
political fighting did not immediately end, never again was it as vitriolic 
or destructive, and as anger began to recede it was clear that Connecticut 
had successfully weathered a severe storm. 
Pitkin's name is not as familiar to school children as Hancock's, 
but he occupied much the same position in Connecticut as Hancock 
did in Massachusetts. 19 In a colony known for its propensity to revere 
a few select old families and trust them with its leadership, the Pitkin 
claim to ancestral superiority could hardly be surpassed. Both Wil-
liam's grandfather and father, William Pitkin I and II, had been assist-
ants to the governor and had probably only missed being elected governor 
17 The best discussion of this whole process is in Richard BusHMAN, From 
Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690-1765 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1967). The secondary literature on the erosion of "steady habits" is summed 
up and analyzed in Christopher Collier, "Steady Habits Considered and Reconsidered," 
Connecticut Review, 5 (April 1972): 28-37. 
u See Oscar ZEICHNER, Connecticut's Years of Controversy, 1750-1776 (Williams-
burg, Virginia, 1949); and Christopher CoLLIER, Roger Sherman's Connecticut: Yankee 
Politics and the American Revolution (Middletown, Connecticut, 1971). 
19 An extensive secondary literature does not exist for William Pitkin as it does 
for John Hancock. The subsequent discussion is based on Bruce DANIELS, Connecticut's 
First Family: William Pitkin and His Connections (Chester, Connecticut, 1975). 
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by premature deaths. The Pitkins were the only family to have two close 
relatives serving together in the Assistants' Council since the Winthrops 
had in the seventeenth century. The family, large and concentrated almost 
entirely in Hartford, dominated the politics of the capital town during 
the eighteenth century. As large landowners with interests all over the 
colony, major merchants engaged in the import-export trade, and partic-
ularly as owners of many mills on the Connecticut River, the Pitkins 
collectively and individually appeared to "middlin'" men as gentlemen 
of great fortune. 
William, the governor, had a long career in Connecticut politics 
before his revolutionary election and was deputy governor during his 
rival Fitch's governorship. As a Hartford town leader, deputy to the 
General Assembly, assistant to the governor, Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, and deputy governor, William always appeared to be a moderate, 
conciliatory politician. His devotion to the New Light version of religion 
during the Great Awakening and to liberty in the early 1760s could not be 
questioned, yet Pitkin never seemed to be controversial or under attack 
as mots New Light leaders were. He was at his best when sorting out some 
thorny local problem as an arbiter appointed by the General Assem-
bly; and once, in an almost unparalleled case, he resolved a bitter local 
town dispute in the capacity of a private person requested to arbitrate 
by both contending parties. Pitkin drafted petitions to his fellow mag-
istrates in humble and respectful language and managed miraculously to 
appear to rise above the partisan battles of the era while all around him 
his Connecticut contemporaries flayed away at one another. He was, in 
short, a man of renowned piety, ancestry, wealth, and accomplishment, 
judicious and conciliatory, and yet firmly attached to the cause of liberty. 
The New Lights never seriously considered anyone else as their 
candidate to oust Fitch in 1766. Connecticut had its equivalent of Samuel 
Adams ; Eliphalet Dyer, the fierty purist from Windham, was identified 
far more than Pitkin with the most ardent spirit of the pre-revolutionary 
movement. 2° Connecticut men perceived, however, that a purist or upstart 
could not heal the colony's wounds while a moderate politician respected 
by all would have a soothing effect on the colony and would lower the 
political intensity instead of ·raising it. No other New Light possessed 
the stature and character necessary to ease Connecticut government into 
the hands of a friend of liberty with a minimum of trauma and discord. 
Pitkin, like Hancock, enjoyed unusual popularity and survived 
successfully all future attempts by Fitch to regain the governorship. The 
only criticism leveled by contemporaries accused him of pandering to the 
wishes of the masses. An anti-New Light ballad written shortly after his 
death chided Pitkin metaphorically for steering the ship of state with too 
close an attention to the crew and of trying to "accomplish every measure 
by a how do you do, with a decent bow, and a shaking of hands forever." 
His Old Light adversaries never fully perceived that it was the very 
20 See George GROCE, "Eiiphalet Dyer: Connecticut Revolutionist," The Era of 
the American Revolution, Richard MoRRIS, ed., (New York, 1939): 290-305. 
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combination of his elite image with his attempt "to please the seamen" 
that made Pitkin the leader Connecticut turned to when its society seemed 
to be coming apart. 
MESHECH WEARE AND THE GRAFTON COUNTY REVOLT AGAINST NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 
New Hampshire politics, controlled to a strong degree by a small 
oligarchy of wealthy Portsmouth merchant families, was remarkably free 
of serious divisions until the ruling elite committed itself to supporting 
the Townshend Acts. The ground swell of protest against the Acts and 
the colony leadership which supported them abated somewhat with repeal 
in 1770 but the anti-court fervour did not disappear. Four factors combined 
in the years after 1770 to weaken the hold the ruling elite had on the 
populace's loyalty: the proselytizing activities of the Anglicans, which 
was supported by the government; the presence of British troops 
marching across the colony, which rekindled old fears of a standing army ; 
the fiery example of Massachusetts; and Governor John Wentworth's 
loss of influence in England, which made him unable to disregard English 
policy that adversely affected New Hampshire and compelled him to 
enforce unpopular legislation. Until the outbreak of hostilities between 
the colonies and England, however, sectional, ideological, and class 
divisions did not emerge ; instead a government clique backing unpopular 
policies was arrayed against an increasingly angry citizenry. 21 
When in response to the military events in Massachusetts Governor 
Wentworth fted New Hampshire in the summer of 1775, most of the 
colony's ruling oligarchy left also. In the power vacuum created, internal 
divisions surfaced that pitted merchant against farmer, creditor · against 
debtor, radical against moderate, and in particular the South, the East, 
and the seaboard against the North, the West, and the interior. The divi-
sions manifested themselves most seriously in 1781 when thirty-five 
Grafton County towns in the northern interior Connecticut River Valley, 
angered because they could not get their desired share of representation 
in the new state government, seceded from New Hampshire and joined 
the forces that were involved in negotiating with the Continental Congress 
for the creation of a new state - Vermont. Ultimately, after a tense year 
during which internal warfare threatened to break out, the Grafton County 
towns returned to the fold. With this crisis over, the divisions receded 
and New Hampshire entered the post-revolutionary period as a reasonably 
unified state. 22 
21 This paragraph based on Jere DANIELL, Experiment in Republicanism: New 
Hampshire Politics and the American Revolution, 1741-1794 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1970). 
22 The only two serious historians of the Revolution in New Hampshire, while 
disagreeing on an overall interpretation agree on the progression of events. See DANIELL, 
Experiment in Republicanism, and Richard UPTON, Revolutionary New Hampshire: An 
Account of the Social and Political Forces Underlying the Transition from Royal Province 
to American Commonwealth (Port Washington, New York, 1970). Early New Hampshire 
is woefully understudied by professional historians. 
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The man who more than anyone else held New Hampshire together 
and ended the northern secession movement was the state's first president, 
Meshech Weare. Weare, a wealthy landowner from Hampton Falls, 
came from a family "justly proud" of its ancestry that had long been 
associated with New Hampshire leadership. His grandfather, Nathaniel 
Weare, had been one of the greatest men of the province and had led 
the much-gloried overthrow of the tyrant Governor Cranfield; his father, 
also Nathaniel, was Hampton's most illustrious citizen and a prominent 
member of the colony's assembly. Meshech, destined to political leader-
ship by virtue of birth, was elected the moderator of a town meeting at 
age twenty-six and six years later succeeded his father as a deputy to the 
General Assembly. He was elected successively auditor and clerk and was 
made speaker at the age of forty-one in 1752, all unusual positions for 
a young man in a society known to revere age. Weare led the colony's 
delegation to the Albany Conference on the Plan for Union in 1754 and 
served as a justice of the Superior Court on the eve of the Revolution. 
Few men in New Hampshire could lay greater claim to a place of 
respect. His home was a sumptuous mansion, be paid the largest tax in his 
home town of Hampton Falls, he owned land in sixteen towns, and a 
town, Weare, chartered by Governor Benning Wentworth in 1764, was 
named after his family. 23 
Weare possessed personal assets to match his ancestral, political, 
and economic ones. At an early age he had an "appearance of genius" 
and later won prizes for academic excellence while at Harvard. Weare 
studied divinity and showed signs of being a great preacher; he only 
turned away from a career in the ministry because, as a friend wrote, he 
felt "impelled to give up clerical pursuits for the . care of his estates and 
public service, by circumstances of family life, inheritance of estates, 
and the ready desire of his fellow townsmen to employ him in civil mat-
ters." Even after deciding against a career as a minister he preached as 
a guest in many pulpits around his home. Every historian who has written 
of him stresses what one called his "amiable and discreet deportment." 
The words "cautious" and "moderate" occur frequently in descriptions 
of Weare showing him to have been a man of exceptional judiciousness. 24 
Despite his cautious nature, Weare became known as a friend of 
liberty by the time of ·the Stamp Act debate and as an ardent patriot 
when he wrote and published poetry against the Tea Act. In New Hamp-
shire's second provinciw congress, called to deal with the revolutionary 
crisis, Weare emerged as the unquestionable leader of the moderate 
23 Avery BuTTERS, "New Hampshire History and the Public Career of Meshech 
Wear, 1713 to 1786," (Ph.D. thesis Fordham University, 1961), pp. S, 11, 14, 123, 
30, 40-SO; DANIELL, Experiment in Republicanism, chaps. 2 and 3; Clifford SHIPTON, 
"Meshech Weare," Biographical Sketches of Harvard Graduates, Vol. IX, S90-60S; UPTON, 
Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 14; and William LITTLE, History of Weare (Concord, 
1888). 
24 BUTTERS, "New Hampshire History," pp. IS, 20, 23; DANIELL, Experiment 
in Republicanism, p. 121; SHIPTON, "Meshech Weare," pp. S96, Sf¥1, 604; and UPTON, 
Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 44. 
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Whigs and was chosen president of the third congress. When most of 
New Hampshire's elite leaders abdicated their power and discord engulfed 
the state in factional fighting, Weare was almost everyone's choice to 
head the new government; under a new constitution he was elected the 
President of the Council, the state's chief executive position. Jeremy 
Belknap, New Hampshire's first comprehensive historian, described 
Weare's popularity as unrivaled in the history of the colony and a more 
recent his.torian quoted one observer as r:emarking that Weare "acquired 
so much popularity his countrymen expected salvation from his wisdom 
Qr arm alone." 25 · 
It would not be too much of an exaggeration to argue that perhaps 
New Hampshire' s salvation, if salvation can be defined as staying intact 
as a political unit, came from Weare's wisdom alone. Cautiously, he 
used his prestige ·and great popularity to bring stability to the state. 
He halted the rampant inflation by persuading the assembly to levy heavy 
taxes ; these provided money to support the war effort. When the new 
revolutionary government seemed on the brink of falling apart, Weare 
championed constitutional reform and arranged for the transfer of exec-
utive power to the Committee of Safety of which be and two other men 
were the chief members. In particular, Weare acted as a calming influence 
on the radicals among the revolutionaries and kept them from initiating 
measures that would have ripped the new state apart into warring parties. 
Finally, under another new constitution, as the first President of New 
Hampshire, Weare personally rode over the White Mountains in the dead 
of winter to contain the Grafton County Revolution. Bloodshed between 
Grafton County and . the rest of New Hampshire could easily have occurred; 
troops were authorized to quell the rebellion, but forebearance of 
the new state government under Weare delayed the development and 
a political solution was arranged. The final compromise came when Weare 
who was both old and ill retired as Chief Justice of the Superior 
Court and arranged for a Grafton County man to replace him. 26 
Weare' s devotion to the revolutionary cause, caution and mode-
ration, and great popularity, are the qualities always singled out by New 
Hampshire historians. His contemporaries, mindful of these qualities and 
their role in guiding New Hampshire from colony to state, were also 
impressed that someone with Weare's wealth and position in society would 
risk both in such an uncertain venture. As one wrote, ''truly sensible I 
am · that you have sunk a fortune and exposed a large family to danger 
of being ruined.'' 27 The assets that to a later and more socially dem-
ocratic nation would seem artificial, wealth and family, were the very 
25 BUTTERS, "New Hampshire History," pp. 122, 123-26, 277 ; DANIELL, Expe-
riment in Republicanism, pp. 127, 128 ; SHIPTON, "Meshech Weare," p. 595 ; and UPTON, 
Revolutionary New Hampshire , p. 14. 
26 BUTTERS, "New Hampshire History," pp. 203, 269 ; DANIELL, Experiment in 
Republicanism, pp. 124, 125, 130, 150, 151, 161, 162; SHIPTON, "Meshech Weare," p. 598 ; 
and UPTON, Revolutionary New Hampshire, pp. 44, 45, 53-51. 
27 BUTTERS, "New Hampshire History," p. 276; and SHIPTON, "Meshech Weare," 
p. 602. 
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qualities that, combined with Weare's natural leadership and moderation, 
gave him the popularity to lead New Hampshire through deep divisions 
that could have resulted in civil war and the dismemberment of the state. 
JosEPH WANTON AND THE ENDING oF THE WARD-HoPKINS CoNTROVERSY 
IN RHODE ISLAND 
The factional and contentious nature of Rhode Island society and 
politics was legendary in colonial New England; eighteenth-century 
citizens of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut referred 
to Rhode Island as "Rogues' Island" or "the land where people think 
otherwise." The prospect of "Rhode Islandism" coming to their colony 
was a horrible spectre guaranteed to frighten inhabitants of the old Puritan 
colonies. 28 Factions were more developed towards political parties in 
Rhode Island than in any other mainland colony except New York. 
For the twenty years before the revolutionary period two well-defined 
political machines, one led by the Wards of Westerly and Newport and 
the other by the Hopkins of Providence, vied for control of the colonial 
government. The struggle, bitter and steeped in vituperation, aroused 
Rhode Island into a semi-annual frenzy. All serious students of Rhode 
Island's past agree that the vicious divisions were rooted in a contest 
between two different geographical sections and had no ideological 
overtones; power, wealth, patronage, and personal ambition fueled the 
fight and not differing visions of the good society. 29 
While the rest of New England assumed that Rhode Islanders gloried 
in dissent and loved every contentious minute of it, the discord was 
always deplored, especially by those most intimately involved in fomenting 
it. Even Rhode Island men, famed for their political infighting, bemoaned 
partisan activity, feared combinations to gain office, and shared the 
eighteenth-century quest for unity and the public good. Both the Ward 
and the Hopkins factions feared the colony would be torn apart and 
not survive the struggle. Both sides were continually sending forth 
compromise proposals to end the fighting and bring some semblance 
of peace to the strife-ridden society. 
Suspicion between the two sides overcame the early attempts at a 
compromise solution, but the divisions that emerged between mother 
country and colonies in the 1760s added a new urgency to the campaign 
for internal unity. As the revolutionary crisis grew more grave in the 
late 1760s, by mutual agreement factional fighting had to come to an end. 
Both Stephen Hopkins and Samuel Ward, while unalterably opposed to 
28 Sydney JAMES, Colonial Rhode Island: A History (New York, 1975), p. 296. 
29 The best account of the Ward-Hopkins years is in David LovEJoY, Rhode 
Island Politics and the American Revolution, 1760-1776 (Providence, Rhode Island, 1958), 
passim. See also Samuel ARNOLD, History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations, 2 vols. (New York, 1860), II, pp. 245-93 ; Frank BATES, Rhode Island and 
the Formation of the Union (New York, 1898), pp. 37, 38, 39; JAMES, Colonial Rhode 
Island, pp. 296; and Irwin PoLISHooK, Rhode Island and the Union (Evanston, Illinois, 
1969), pp. 12, 13, 43 . 
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each other, also unalterably opposed encroachments on Rhode Island's 
liberties by Parliament. As Rhode Island's first important historian wrote, 
''the famous controversy... ceased forever in the presence of a more 
momentous struggle." Governor Stephen Hopkins proposed, from a posi-
tion of strength, to end the feud by a compromise that would remove 
both himself and Samuel Ward from active officeholding and put the 
governorship in the hands of a man mutually acceptable to both. Accord-
ingly in April of 1768 Josias Lyndon was chosen governor as a com-
promise candidate but the compromise was shortlived and political 
warfare blazed again because Lyndon could not keep in the good graces 
of both factions. 3o 
The election of Joseph Wanton to the governorship in 1769 proved 
to be the event which ended the Ward-Hopkins controversy as a significant 
force in Rhode Island politics. Under the conciliatory leadership of Wanton 
the colony enjoyed six years of relative stability and most Rhode Islanders 
approved their governor's firm protests against British imperial policy. 
Historians may now argue that Wanton was a candidate of the Hopkins 
factions, but contemporaries did not see him as a stalking horse for 
anyone and perceived him as someone who rose above the petty par-
tisan battles. 31 His moderate image had widespread appeal and Wanton, 
burying Ward in the election, even won a majority in Ward's home town 
and power base, Newport, and in the adjacent towns of Middletown 
and Portsmouth. The Ward's closest allies in Providence, the Browns, 
supported Wanton, and the coalitionist spirit and movement overwhelmed 
the Ward family who did not accept it but were not strong enough to 
continue the fight. After Wanton's election, Rhode Island was never again 
threatened with disunion during the Revolution and the colony whose 
name was a symbol of divisiveness declared independence and fought the 
Revolution without widespread internal dissent. 32 
Joseph Wanton, a merchant prince from Newport, was descended from 
a family of colonial governors; his father William, his uncle John Wanton, 
and his cousin Gideon Wanton all had occupied the governor's chair and 
his son, Joseph Junior, had previously been a deputy governor. The 
family, engaged in extensive shipbuilding and the West Indian trade in 
the eighteenth century, had first amassed a fortune as privateers in the 
late seventeenth century and then been co-opted into thtl Newport elite. 
Wanton, a Harvard graduate, had an "amiable disposition, elegant 
manners, and handsome person" and enjoyed such perquisites of a gen-
tleman as expensive clothes and a sumptuous table. He early showed him-
self to be a patriot but, known not to like bitter fights, he did not thrive 
on controversy as so many politicians seemed to: clearly he was a 
30 ARNOLD, History, II, pp. 281-93; BATES, Rhode Island, pp. 39-40; JAMES, 
Colonial Rhode Island, p. 296; LovEJOY, Rhode Island Politics, passim; and POLISHOOK, 
Rhode Island, pp. 12, 13, 43. 
31 LovEJoY, Rhode Island Politics, pp. 150, 151, argues this. 
n Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography, VI; ARNOLD, History, II, 
pp. 281-315; Dictionary of American Biography, XIX, p . 412; LOVEJOY, Rhode Island 
Politics, pp. 150-51, 179, 181; and POLISHOOK, Rhode Island, pp. 12, 13. 
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moderate. As governor, he steered a course between the extreme "sons 
of liberty" and "sons of tyranny" and did his best to mediate all divisons. 
His best was very good: Wanton had virtually no opposition while in 
office and Rhode Island erijoyed six years of internal concord which were 
unparalleled in its past. 33 
Wanton led the opposition to the imperial policies up to the final 
moments before hostilities broke out and was an ardent enough patriot 
that the British suspected him of complicity in the scuttling and burning 
of a revenue ship off the Rhode Island coast. Yet, in the final analysis, 
Wanton could not bring himself to renounce his loyalty to the king and 
direct military operations against the British regular army. Shortly after 
his election to a seventh term in May 1775, he walked out of a room 
to be conveniently absent when the revolutionaries seized his trappings 
of office. Because of Wanton's immense popularity and past patriotism, 
the Whigs did not install his successor until seven months after he was 
deposed and gave him every opportunity to reconsider and take back 
the governorship. An old and sick man, Wanton opted out of the struggle 
rather than make war on his king, but in contrast to his hated counterpart 
in Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, Wanton lived out his life in his 
home colony as a respected figure. 34 
Although technically a Loyalist, Wanton did more to secure Rhode 
Island's unified response to the Revolution than any Whig. Nor did his 
deposition (abdication?) mean the elevation to the governor's chair of 
any out-of-power rabble-rouser. Wanton' s deputy governor, Nicholas 
Cooke, also a wealthy merchant and a moderate, was confirmed as the 
new governor. 35 
* * * * * 
The careers of John Hancock, William Pitkin, Meshech Weare, 
and Joseph Wanton, suggest that neither the consensus nor the conflict 
model alone can successfully explain the Revolution in New England. 
Each of the four colonies at some point in the Revolutionary years expe-
rienced a geographical division bitter and deep enough to push the 
imperial struggle into the background and potentially split the colony in 
33 BATES, Rhode Island, pp. 37, 58; LovEJOY, Rhode Island Politics, p. 179; 
PoLISHOOK, Rhode Island, p. 37; and William WEEDON, The Economic and Social History 
of New England, 2 vols. (New York, 1890), II, p. 583. 
34 ARNOLD, History, II, pp. 347-61 ; Dictionary of American Biography, XIX, 
p. 412 ; JAMES, Colonial Rhode Island, pp. 319, 346; LovEJOY, Rhode Island Politics, 
p. 184; and Mack THOMPSON, Moses Brown: Reluctant Reformer (Williamsburg, Virginia, 
1962), p . 115. 
35 JAMES, Colonial Rhode Island, p. 346; Matt JoNES, ed. , "Revolutionary Cor-
respondence of Governor Nicholas Cooke, 1775-1781," Proceedings of the American 
Antiquarian Society, XXXVI (1926): 231-53; LovEJOY, Rhode Island Politics, p. 184 ; and 
POLISHOOK, Rhode Island , pp. 11, 37. 
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half. 36 Yet, each colony managed to group around one figure and form 
a relatively unified whole to wage a revolution, fight a war, and create 
a stable government. These four men were merely the most visible 
examples of a widespread model of leadership. A recent essay that an-
alyzed the attributes of the ninety-nine most important leaders of 1776 and 
1787 reveals that their collective identity resembled the British peerage 
more than the American yeomanry. 37 Hancock, Pitkin, Weare, and Wan-
ton had an abundance of the qualities society looked for in its leadership 
and had the rare opportunity and ability to make the most of these 
qualities. Other men of the same type preceded and succeeded them. 
As intellectual historians have shown, the goals of colonial society, 
concord and harmony, were ideally attained through non-partisan activ-
ity. By the fourth decade of the nineteenth century a contrary world 
of institutionalized division had emerged where partisan activity was the 
accepted norm. Long before this world of normalized discord could 
be legitimized by Jacksonian rhetoric it had emerged de facto in the colo-
nial world out of the attempts by one area of a colony to capture control 
of the colony's government. 38 The naked realities of electing a government 
gave rise to deep divisions ; embryonic institutions were created to respond 
to these divisions long before the social values of pre-industrial man 
allowed him to accept them. The lack of acceptance made the divisions 
seem all the deeper and more treacherous and made men search des-
perately for a real consensus to match their ideological world. · When 
the revolutionary divisions between the mother country and colonies 
emerged, each of these colonies looked for saviors . to prevent society 
from disintegrating. Wealthy patricians like Hancock, Pitkin, Weare, and 
Wanton, men of patriotism and moderation, men above the people but 
loved by the people, men with long familial histories of leadership, · were 
the natural figures for revolutionary society to tum to in an anachronistic 
attempt to realize a beleaguered communal ideal. 
36 Although possible, it is less clear that meaningful ideological and class dif-
ferences always accompanied these geographical divisions; historians do not agree on 
this and more basic research will have to be done to confirm or disprove that more than 
sectional differences existed. If ideological and class differences did not exist, historians 
may be tempted to say that there was no meaningful conflict in the Revolution since a 
consensus on ideology existed. They could liken this situation to late 19th-century America 
when two parties agreed upon essentials but still fought viciously for contml of the gov-
ernment. However, the fact that the political fights in colonial and Revolutionary America 
were based so strongly on geography, unlike the party struggles of a later period, shows 
that at least one important issue was at stake -for which section's benefit was the colony 
or state to be developed? This is not the same type of issueless conflict as the late 19th 
century indulged in; these divisions could have destroyed the territorial integrity of each of 
the colony's boundaries or even destroyed the revolutionary movement itself. 
37 Richard D. BROWN, "The Founding Fathers of 1776 and 1787: A Collective 
View," William and Mary Quarterly, XXXIII (July 1976): 465-80. 
38 Most historians would agree that, despite its divisions, New England was much 
more homogeneous and unified than the Southern Colonies and in particular more so than 
the Middle Colonies. The success of these two regions waging the Revolution would suggest 
that the model presented here could also apply to ·them. Certainly, the roles of men such 
as George Washington and Benjamin Franklin give a surface indication that other colonies 
were searching for moderate father figures. 
